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MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: SKILL OR LUCK? 
 
 Two key issues on fund performance have been central to recent academic and policy 
debates.  The first is whether average risk adjusted abnormal fund performance (after expenses 
are taken into account) is positive, negative or zero.  On balance, US studies of mutual (and 
pension) funds suggest little or no superior performance but somewhat stronger evidence of 
underperformance (e.g. Lakonishok et al 1992, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 1995, Daniel et al 
1997, Carhart 1997, Chevalier and Ellison 1999, Wermers 2000, Baks et al 2001, Pastor and 
Stambaugh 2002).  Results using UK data on mutual and pension funds give similar results (e.g. 
Blake and Timmermann 1998, Blake, Lehmann and Timmerman 1999, Thomas and Tonks 2001). 
 
 A second major issue is whether abnormal performance can be identified ex-ante and for 
how long it persists. Persistence is examined using either a contingency table approach or 
performance ranked portfolio strategies or by observing actual trades of mutual funds.  Using the 
first two techniques the evidence is rather mixed.  For US funds it seems that selecting funds with 
superior future performance is rather difficult and probably impossible, unless portfolio 
rebalancing is frequent (e.g. at least once per year) and the performance horizon is not longer 
than about one-year (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman 1992, Hendricks, Patel and Zechauser 1993, 
Brown and Goetzmann 1995, Carhart 1997, Wermers 2003, Blake and Morey 2000, Bollen and 
Busse 2005, Mamaysky, Spiegel and Zhang 2004).  A recent exception is Teo and Woo (2001) 
who find persistence in style adjusted returns for up to six years.   
 
 Studies using actual trades of mutual funds find that one-year persistence amongst 
winner funds is due to stocks passively carried over, rather than newly purchased stocks of 
winner funds performing better than newly purchased stocks of loser funds (Chen et al 2000).  
Following on from this Wermers (2003) finds that persistent large cash inflows to winner funds are 
invested with a lag and the average dollar invested in past winner funds does not earn more than 
that invested in past loser funds. This is consistent with the hypothesis of Berk and Green (2004) 
where excess fund returns are quickly bid away in a competitive market.   
 
 For UK data on mutual and pension funds there is little evidence of persistence in 
superior performance but much stronger evidence that poor performers continue to under-
perform (e.g. Blake and Timmermann 1998, Allen and Tan 1999, Fletcher and Forbes 2002, 
Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann 1999, Tonks 2004).  
 
This study examines the performance of open-end mutual funds investing in UK equity 
(Unit Trusts and Open Ended Investment Companies OEICs) during the period April 1975 to 
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December 2002.  A data set of over 900 equity funds is examined. This represents almost the 
entire UK equity mutual fund industry at the end of the sample period.  In comparison with the US 
mutual fund industry, there have been comparatively few studies of the performance of UK 
mutual funds (unit trusts).  Unlike many previous studies the focus of this paper is on individual 
fund performance (particularly in the tails of the performance distribution) and in determining the 
role of luck versus skill.   
 
In contrast to earlier studies which use ‘conventional’ statistical measures, often applied 
to portfolios of funds, we use a cross-section bootstrap procedure across all individual funds.  
This enables our ‘luck distribution’ for any chosen fund (e.g. the best fund), to encapsulate 
possible outcomes of luck not just for our chosen fund but across all the funds in our data set.  
We are then able to separate ‘skill’ from ‘luck’ in the performance of individual funds, even when 
the distribution of idiosyncratic risk across many funds is highly non-normal.  This methodology 
has not been applied to UK data and was first applied to US mutual funds by Kosowski, 
Timmermann, White and Wermers (2004).    
 
As noted above, the absolute performance of mutual (and pension) funds and the relative 
performance of active versus passive (index) funds are central to recent policy debates, 
particularly in Europe.  With increasing longevity and given projected state pensions, a ‘savings 
gap’ is predicted for many European countries in 20 years time (Turner 2004, OECD 2003).  Will 
voluntary saving in mutual and pension funds over the next 20 years be sufficient to fill this gap, 
so that those reaching retirement age have sufficient savings to provide an adequate standard of 
living?  A key element here is the attractiveness of savings products in general and also the 
choice between actively managed and passive (or index/tracker) funds.  
 
In recent theoretical and empirical work, the allocation across different asset classes 
(mainly bonds versus stocks, but in principal across all asset classes) has been examined in an 
intertemporal framework.  The ‘rule of thumb’ that the percentage investment in risky assets 
(stocks) should equal ‘100 minus your age’ is not robust either in the face of uncertain income 
(which gives rise to hedging demands – Bodie, Merton and Samuelson 1992, Campbell and 
Viceira 1999, Viceira 2001) or, when return predictability is present (Brennan et al 1997, 
Campbell et al 2003) or, when there is uncertainty about parameters in the prediction equation for 
returns (Barberis 2000, Xia 2001).  In practice, the lack of a consensus ‘model’ of asset allocation 
at both the ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ level is starkly illustrated by Boots (the UK chemist) switching 
all its pension fund assets into bonds in 2001 (for strategic not market timing reasons), while most 
UK pension funds continue to hold around 70% of their assets in stocks.  In the US, participants 
in 401(K) retirement plans (Benartzi and Thaler 2001), when faced with the choice between 
several funds each of which has alternative proportions of stocks and bonds, tend to use a simple 
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1/n allocation rule - so the actual allocation to each asset class is not determined by any 
sophisticated optimization problem and is changed infrequently.  Such naïve asset allocation 
decisions may carry over to investment in mutual funds (and even trustees’ decisions for pension 
fund asset allocations), so that poor funds survive and exacerbate the savings gap. 
 
The behavioral finance literature (see Barberis and Thaler 2003 for a survey) has 
provided theoretical models and empirical evidence which suggests that active stock picking 
‘styles’ such as value-growth (LaPorta et al 1997, Chan and Lakonishok 2004) and momentum 
(Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, 2001, Chan et al 1996, 2000, Hon and Tonks 2003), as well as 
market timing strategies (Pesaran and Timmermann 1994, 1995, 2000, Ang and Bekaert 2004) 
can earn abnormal returns after correcting for risk and transactions costs.  Large sections of the 
mutual fund sector follow these active strategies and more recently there is an ongoing debate on 
whether mutual (and pension) funds should be allowed to invest in hedge funds and private 
equity, which also follow a wide variety of active strategies. The question is therefore whether one 
can find actively managed funds which outperform index funds (after correcting for risk and 
transactions costs).   
 
The Presidential Commission on Social Security Reform (2001) and the State of the 
Union Address (2005) envisage the part-privatization of US Social Security.  This will increase 
debate on all aspects of  the fund management industry, particularly in the light of the ‘market 
timing’ abuses uncovered in the US by New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer (Goetzmann, 
Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst 2001) - which has reduced confidence in the financial service sector’s 
ability to provide adequate and fair treatment of retail investors.  In the UK, the continuing switch 
from defined benefit to defined contribution pension schemes will strengthen the argument for a 
closer analysis of active versus passive strategies (as well as the competence and independence 
of trustee governance arrangements-Myners 2001).   
 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK is concerned that (retail) investors may 
be misled by mutual fund advertising. In its ‘comparative tables’ it currently does not enter a 
fund’s ranking vis-a-vis competitor funds, in terms of (raw) returns.  The FSA believes this could 
encourage more investment in funds which may simply have high returns because they are more 
risky (Blake and Timmermann 1998 and 2003 and Charles River Associates 2002).   
 
To the extent that any ‘savings gap’ is to be filled by investment in mutual funds, the need 
to evaluate risk adjusted performance in a tractable and intuitive way, while taking account of the 
inherent uncertainty in performance measures, will be of increasing importance.  This paper 
directly addresses the issue of ‘skill versus luck’.  We use ‘alpha’ α  and the t-statistic of alpha 
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tα , as our measures of risk adjusted performance of mutual funds.  However, we do not assume, 
as many earlier studies do, that a fund’s idiosyncratic risk has a known parametric distribution.  
Instead we bootstrap the empirical distribution of idiosyncratic risk not just fund-by-fund, but 
across the whole cross-section of funds.  This allows us to obtain a performance distribution for 
funds which are in the tails of the cross-section distribution – precisely the funds that investors 
are likely to be most interested in (i.e. extreme ‘winners’ or ‘losers’).   
 
In fact, we mainly use tα  rather than ‘alpha’ α  as our performance statistic since it has 
superior statistical properties and helps mitigate survival bias problems (Brown, Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson and Ross 1992).  We also perform a number of bootstrap techniques to account for any 
serial correlation or heteroscedasticity in the idiosyncratic risk of each fund and possible 
contemporaneous cross-section correlation.  The bootstrap procedure is robust to possible 
misspecification but reported results are of course dependent on the chosen performance model.  
We therefore examine a wide range of alternative models which we divide into three broad 
classes (i) unconditional models (Jensen 1968, Fama and French 1993, Carhart 1997) (ii) 
‘conditional-beta’ models, in which factor loadings are allowed to change with conditioning public 
information (Ferson and Schadt 1996) and (iii) ‘conditional alpha-beta’ models where conditioning 
information also allows for time varying alphas (Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman 1998).  
We control for survivor bias by including 236 ‘nonsurviving’ funds in the analysis.  
 
We now anticipate some of our key findings.  First the good news.  The bootstrap 
procedure indicates there is strong evidence in support of genuine stock picking ability on the part 
of a relatively small number of ‘top ranked’ UK equity mutual funds.  For example (using the 
Fama-French 3 factor unconditional model), of the top 20 ranked funds in the positive tail of the 
performance distribution, 7 funds exhibit levels of performance which cannot be attributable to 
‘luck’ at 5% significance level, while 12 funds exhibit such performance at 10% significance level.  
As we move further towards the centre of the performance distribution (e.g. below the 97% 
percentile) many funds have positive alphas but this can be attributed to luck rather than skill.   
 
In the left tail of the performance distribution, from the worst (ex-post) fund manager to 
the fund manager at the 40th percentile, we find that an economically significant negative 
abnormal performance cannot be attributed to bad luck but is due to ‘bad skill’.  Therefore there 
are a large number of poorly performing active funds in the universe of UK equity mutual funds.  
This is consistent with findings from the ‘behavioral finance’ literature where retail investors often 
use simple rules of thumb in asset allocation and who face inertia, learning and search costs 
when trying to evaluate alternatives.   
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When examining different fund ‘styles’, we find genuine outperformance among the top 
equity income funds but there is little evidence of skill for the top performers amongst the ‘all 
company’ and small stock funds.  For ‘all companies’ and small stock funds the extreme left tail of 
the performance distribution indicates ‘bad skill’ rather than bad luck – but for income funds the 
converse applies – the poor performance of income funds is due to bad luck rather than ‘bad 
skill’.  We also find that the top ranked ‘onshore funds’ have genuine skill, whereas the positive 
alphas for the best ‘offshore funds’ are due to luck.  In the left tails of these distributions, we find 
that extreme poor performers (negative alphas), whether they are onshore or offshore, 
demonstrate ‘bad skill’ rather than bad luck.  
 
Broadly speaking, the above results are robust across all three classes of model we 
investigate, across several variants of the bootstrap and do not appear to be subject to 
survivorship bias.  The strong message from these results is that there are a few ‘top funds’ who 
have genuine skill but the majority have either no skill and do well because of luck or, perform 
worse than bad luck and essentially waste investors time and money.  If you choose your active 
funds by throwing darts at the Financial Times’ mutual fund pages, then you are highly likely to 
choose a fund which has no skill - you would be better off choosing an index fund (especially after 
transactions costs).  On the other hand, a careful analysis of risk adjusted performance taking full 
account of luck across all funds, can identify with reasonable probability, those few funds with 
genuine skill.    
 
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows.  Section 1 describes the data used in the 
study. In section 2 we discuss performance measurement models applied to mutual fund returns.  
Section 3 details the bootstrap methodology. In section 4 we evaluate the performance 
measurement models and select a subset of ‘best models’ to which we apply the bootstrap 
procedure. Section 5 examines the results of the bootstrap analysis and section 6 concludes.   
 
 
1. Data  
Our mutual fund data set comprises 935 equity Unit Trusts and Open Ended Investment 
Companies (OEICs).  These funds invest primarily in UK equity (i.e. minimum 80% must be in UK 
equities) and represent almost the entire set of equity funds which have existed at any point 
during the sample period under consideration, April 1975 – December 2002.  Unit trusts are ‘open 
ended’ mutual funds, they can only be traded between the investor and the trust manager and 
there is no secondary market.  They differ from ‘investment trusts’ which are closed end funds.  
Mutual fund monthly returns data have been obtained from Fenchurch Corporate Services using 
Standard & Poor's Analytical Software and Data.  By restricting funds to those investing in UK 
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equity, more accurate benchmark factor portfolios may be used in estimating risk adjusted 
abnormal performance.  
 
In our database of 935 funds, we remove ‘second units’. These arise because of mergers 
or ‘splits’ and in the vast majority of cases the mergers occur early and the splits occur late in the 
fund’s life, and therefore these second units report relatively few ‘independent’ returns.  
Furthermore, 93 of the funds in the database are market (FTSE 250) index/tracker funds and as 
we are interested in stock selection ability, these are also excluded.  This leaves 842 non-tracker 
independent (i.e. non-second unit) funds for our analysis.   
 
The equity funds are categorized by the investment objectives of the funds which include: 
equity income (162 funds), ‘all companies’ (i.e. formerly general equity and equity growth, 553 
funds) and smaller companies (127 funds).  The data set includes both surviving funds (699) and 
nonsurviving funds (236).  Nonsurviving funds may cease to exist because they were merged 
with other funds or they may have been forced to close due to bad performance.  Because of the 
latter scenario, it is critical to include nonsurviving funds in any performance analysis of the 
mutual fund industry, as failure to do so may bias performance findings upwards (Carhart et al 
2002).  In addition, funds are also categorized by the location of operation. Onshore funds (731) 
are managed in the UK while offshore funds (204) are operated from Dublin, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, the Channel Islands or some other European locations. 
 
All fund returns are measured gross of taxes on dividends and capital gains and net of 
management fees.  Because our focus is on the performance of the fund’s managers rather than 
on returns to investors/customers, our returns data is calculated bid-price to bid-price (with 
income reinvested).   
 
The market factor used is the FT All Share Index of total returns (i.e. including reinvested 
dividends).  Excess returns are calculated using the one-month UK T-bill rate.  The factor 
mimicking portfolio for the size effect, SMB, is the difference between the monthly returns on the 
Hoare Govett Small Companies (HGSC) Index and the returns on the FT 100 index1.  The value 
premium, HML, is the difference between the monthly returns of the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) UK value index and the returns on the MSCI UK growth index2.  The factor 
                                                 
1  The HGSC index measures the performance of the lowest 10% of stocks by market capitalization, 
of the main UK equity market.  Both indices are total return measures.   
2  These indices are constructed by Morgan Stanley who ranks all the stocks in their UK national 
index by their book-to-market ratio.  Starting with the highest book-to-market ratio stocks, these are 
attributed to the value index until 50% of the market capitalization of the national index is reached.  The 
remaining stocks are attributed to the growth index.  The MSCI national indices have a market coverage of 
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mimicking portfolio’s momentum behavior, MOM, has been constructed using the constituents of 
the London Share Price Data Base, (total return) index3.  
         
Other variables used in conditional and market timing models include the one-month UK 
T-bill rate, the dividend yield on the FT-All Share index and the slope of the term structure (i.e. the 
yield on the UK 20 year gilt minus the yield on the UK three-month T-bill). 
 
 
2. Performance Models  
The alternative models of performance we consider are well known ‘factor models’ and 
therefore we only describe these briefly.  Each model can be represented in its unconditional, 
conditional-beta and conditional alpha-beta form.  For all models the intercept (‘alpha’) α  and in 
particular the t-statistic of alpha αt , are our measures of risk adjusted abnormal performance.   
 
Unconditional Models 
These have factor loadings that are time invariant.  The alpha iα  of the CAPM or market 
model (Jensen 1968) is given by the regression:  
 
(1)             titmiiti rr ,,, εβα ++=  
 
where ( )tftiti RRr ,,, −= , tiR , = return on fund-i in period t, tfR ,  = risk free rate, 
( )tftmtm RRr ,,, −=  is the excess return on the market portfolio.   
 
Carhart’s (1997) performance measure is the alpha estimate from a four-factor model:  
 
(2)   , 1 , 2 3 4 ,i t i i m t i t i t i t i tr r SMB HML MOMα β β β β ε= + + + + +  
 
where tSMB , tHML  and tMOM  are factor mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market value 
and momentum effects, respectively.  On US data, Fama and French (1993) find that a three-
factor model including tmr , , tSMB  and tHML  factors, provides significantly greater power than 
                                                                                                                                                 
at least 60% (more recently this has been increased to 85%).  Total return indices are used for the 
construction of the HML variable. 
3  For each month, the equally weighted average returns of stocks with the highest and lowest 30% 
returns, over the previous six months are calculated.  The MOM variable is constructed by taking the 
difference between these two variables.  The universe of stocks is the London Share Price Data Base.  
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the CAPM.  In addition, Carhart(1997) finds that momentum is statistically significant in explaining 
(decile) returns on US mutual funds – although the latter variable is less prevalent in studies on 
UK data (e.g. Blake and Timmermann 1998, Quigley and Sinquefield 2000, Tonks 2004).  
 
Conditional-Beta Models 
Conditional models (Ferson and Schadt 1996) allow for the possibility that a fund’s factor 
betas depend on lagged public information variables.  This may arise because of under and over-
pricing (Chan 1988 and Ball and Kothari 1989), or changing financial characteristics of companies 
such as gearing, earnings variability and dividend policy (Foster 1986, Mandelker and Rhee 
1984, Hochman 1983, Bildersee 1975).  Also, an active fund manager may alter portfolio weights 
and consequently portfolio betas depending on public information.  Thus there may well be time 
variation in the portfolio betas depending on the information set tZ  so that 
'
, 0 2 ( )i t i tb B zβ = + , 
where tz  is the vector of deviations of tZ  from its unconditional mean.  For the CAPM this gives: 
 
(3) ', 1 0 , 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( * )i t i i b t i t b t i tr b r B z rα ε+ + + += + + +  
 
where , 1b tr +  = the excess return on a benchmark portfolio (i.e. market portfolio in this case).  The 
null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance is H0: iα  = 0.   
 
Conditional Alpha-Beta Models 
Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) assume that alpha (as well as the beta’s) 
may depend linearly on tz  so that ( )tiiti zA '0, += αα  and the performance model is: 
 
(4)   ' ', 1 0 0 , 1 , 1 , 1( ) ( ) ( * )i t i i t i b t i t b t i tr A z b r B z rα ε+ + + += + + + +   
 
Here, 0iα measures abnormal performance after controlling for (i) publicly available 
information, tz  and (ii) adjustment of the factor loadings based on publicly available information.          
 
 Following earlier studies (Ferson and Schadt 1996, Christopherson, Ferson and 
Glassman 1998) our Zt variables include permutations of : the one-month T-Bill yield, the dividend 
yield of the market factor and the term spread.  
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Market Timing  
In addition to stock selection skills, models of portfolio performance also attempt to 
identify whether fund managers have the ability to market-time.  Can fund managers successfully 
assess the future direction of the market in aggregate and alter the market beta accordingly? (see 
Admati et al 1986).  In the model of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) a successful market timer adjusts 
the market factor loading ,[ ]it i im m trβ θ γ= +  so that (1) may now be written:  
 
(5)     2, , , ,( ) [ ]i t i i m t im m t i tr r rα θ γ ε= + + +  
 
where 0imγ > is the unconditional measure of market timing ability.  Alternatively, the Merton and 
Henriksson (1981) model of market timing is:  
 
(6)    , , , ,( ) [ ]i t i i m t im m t i tr r rα θ γ ε+= + + +   
 
where [ ]+tmr , = { }tmr ,,0max  and imγ  is the unconditional measure of market timing ability.  
These two models can be easily generalized to a conditional-beta model, where iβ  also depends 
on the public information set, tz  (Ferson and Schadt 1996).  
 
 As a test of robustness, each of the above models is estimated for each mutual fund. 
Results are then averaged across funds in order to select a single ‘best fit’ model from each of 
the three classes: unconditional, conditional-beta and conditional alpha-beta models.  These 
three ‘best’ models are used in the subsequent (computationally intensive) bootstrap analysis.  
 
 
3. Bootstrap Methodology 
Previous studies of UK unit trust performance all use ‘conventional’ statistical measures, 
and generally find (using a three or four factor model) that there is little or no positive abnormal 
performance by (portfolios of) ‘best’ funds, whereas the ‘worst’ funds have statistically significant 
negative risk adjusted performance (see inter alia, Blake and Timmermann 1998, Quigley and 
Sinquefield 2000, Fletcher and Forbes 2002).  Among US mutual funds there is little evidence of 
positive abnormal performance but stronger evidence of poor performing funds - Carhart (1997), 
Christopherson et al (1998), Hendricks et al (1993).  It has been argued that abnormal 
performance may be due to a momentum effect in existing stock holdings rather than genuine 
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stock picking skill (Carhart 1997, Chen et al 2000), although the evidence is not entirely definitive 
(Chen et al 2000 and Wermers  2000).  
 
In this paper we use a cross-section bootstrap procedure and are able to separate ‘skill’ 
from ‘luck’ for individual funds, even when idiosyncratic risks are highly non-normal – as is the 
case for funds in the extreme tails, in which investors are particularly interested.  We begin with a 
largely intuitive exposition of our bootstrap analysis, using ‘alpha’ as our measure of risk adjusted 
abnormal performance and the market model (CAPM) as the ‘true model’ of expected fund 
returns.   
 
In a large universe of funds (say n = 1,000) there will always be some funds that perform 
well (badly), simply due to good (bad) luck.  Assume that when all funds have no stock picking 
ability (i.e. H0: iα  = 0 for i = 1, 2, …, n) each fund’s ‘true’ alpha is normally distributed and each 
fund has a different but known standard deviation iσ . Suppose we are interested in the 
performance of the best fund.  If we ‘replay history’ just for the ‘best fund’, where we impose iα  = 
0 (here i = best fund) but ‘luck’ is represented by the normal distribution with known standard 
deviation iσ , we would sample a different estimate of alpha.  Of course there is a high probability 
that we sample a value of alpha close to zero, but ‘luck’ implies that we may sample a value for 
alpha which is in the extreme tails of the distribution.  Similarly, when we resample the alpha for 
all the other n-1 funds, with all iα  = 0 (but with different iσ ), it is quite conceivable that the 
second or third etc. ranked fund in the ex-post data, now has the highest alpha.  This would hold 
a fortiori if the distributions of the second, or third, etc. ranked funds have relatively large values 
of iσ .   
 
From this single ‘replay of history’, with iα  = 0 across all funds, we have 
(1) (1) (1)
1 2( , ,... )nα α α  from which we choose the largest value (1)maxα .  So, taking the ‘luck 
distribution’ across all funds into consideration (with different iσ ’s), we now have one value 
)1(
maxα for the best fund which arises purely due to sampling variability or luck.  However, by 
repeating the above (B-times) and each time choosing )(max
kα  (for k = 1, 2, …, B trials) we can 
obtain the complete distribution of maxα  under the null of no outperformance, which we denote 
max( )f α .  
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 Note that the distribution max( )f α  uses the information about ‘luck’ represented by all 
the funds and not just the ‘luck’ encountered by the ‘best fund’ in the ex-post ranking.  This is a 
key difference between our study and many earlier studies that have used this type of 
methodology.  It is important to measure the performance distribution of the ‘best fund’ not just by 
re-sampling from the distribution of the best fund ex-post, since this is a single realization of ‘luck’ 
for one particular fund.  Clearly, re-running history for just the ex-post best fund ignores the other 
possible distributions of luck (here just the different standard deviations) encountered by all other 
funds – these other ‘luck distributions’ provide highly valuable and relevant information.   
 
Having obtained our ‘luck distribution’, we now compare the best fund’s actual ex-post 
performance given by its estimated maxαˆ  against the ‘luck distribution’ for the best fund.  If maxαˆ   
exceeds the 5% right tail cut off point in max( )f α , we can reject the null hypothesis that the 
performance of the best fund is attributable to luck.  
 
Above, we could have chosen any fund (e.g. the 2nd best fund) on which to base the  
‘luck distribution’.  So, we can compare the actual ex-post ranking for any chosen fund against its 
luck distribution and separate luck from skill, for all individual funds in our sample.  
 
The above demonstrates the main features and intuition behind our analysis of fund 
performance - which is based on the theory of order statistics.  But a key difference in our study 
(which we highlight below) is that under the null of no out-performance, we do not assume the 
distribution of alpha for each fund is normal and each fund’s alpha can in principal take on any 
distribution.  The distribution for each fund’s ‘luck’ is represented by the empirical distribution 
observed in the historic data and this distribution can be different for each fund.  Hence the 
distribution under the null max( )f α , encapsulates all of the different individual fund’s ’luck 
distributions’ (and in a multivariate context this cannot be derived analytically from the theory of 
order statistics).   
 
Investors are particularly interested in funds in the tails of the performance distribution, 
such as the best fund, the second best fund, and so on.  We find that the empirical ‘luck 
distribution’ of alpha for these funds are highly non-normal, thus invalidating the usual test 
statistics.  This motivates the use of the cross-section bootstrap to ascertain whether the 
‘outstanding’ or ‘abysmal’ performance of ‘tail funds’ is due to either, good or bad skill or good or 
bad luck, respectively.  
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There are a number of possible explanations as to why non-normal security returns can 
remain at the portfolio (mutual fund) level.  As noted by Kosowski et al (2004), co-skewness of 
individual constituent non-normal security returns may not be diversified away in a fund4.  Also, 
funds may hold derivatives to hedge return outcomes and this may result in a non-normal return 
distribution.  
 
Basic Bootstrap 
Kosowski et al (2004) provide a thorough analysis of the bootstrap methodology applied 
to mutual fund performance so we provide only a brief exposition of the basic procedure (see 
Politis and Romano 1994).  Consider an estimated model of equilibrium returns of the form: 
 
(7)  titiiti eXr ,, 'ˆˆ ++= βα    
 
for i = {1, 2, …, n) funds, where iT  = number of observations on fund-i, tir ,  = ( ), ,i t f tR R− , tX = 
matrix of risk factors and tie ,  = residuals of fund-i.  For our ‘basic bootstrap’ we use residual-only 
resampling, under the null of no outperformance.  This involves the following steps (Efron and 
Tibshirani 1993).  First, estimate the chosen model for each fund (separately) and save the 
vectors { }tii e ,,βˆ .  Next, for each fund-i, draw a random sample (with replacement) of length iT  
from the residuals tie , .  While retaining the original chronological ordering of tX , use these re-
sampled bootstrap residuals tie ,~  to generate a simulated excess return series tir ,~  for fund-i, 
under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance (i.e. setting iα  = 0): 
   
(8)  tititi eXr ,, ~'ˆ0~ ++= β    
 
By construction, the ‘true’ abnormal performance, for fund-i is zero.  This is then repeated 
for all funds.  Next, using the simulated returns tir ,~ , the performance model is estimated and the 
resulting estimate of alpha )1(~iα  for each fund is obtained.  The )1(~iα  estimates for each of the n-
funds represent sampling variation around a true value of zero (by construction) and are entirely 
due to ‘luck’.  The )1(~iα  {i = 1, 2, …, n} are then ordered from highest to lowest.  The above 
process is repeated B times for each of the n funds, where B (= 1,000) denotes the number of 
                                                 
4  The central limit theorem implies that a large, well diversified and equal weighted portfolio of non-normally 
distributed securities will approximate normality. However, many funds do not have these characteristics.  
 ‘Mutual Fund Performance: Skill or Luck ?’ 
 13
bootstrap simulations. The bootstrap estimates of iα~  may be gathered in a matrix of dimension 
(n x B) as follows.  
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The first row of this sorted ‘bootstrap matrix’ now contains the highest values of iα~  from 
the B bootstrap simulations, under the null hypothesis iα  = 0.  This is the ‘luck distribution’ for the 
extreme top performer, max( )f α% .  The second row contains the second highest values of iα%  etc.  
Therefore each row of the bootstrap matrix provides a separate distribution of performance 
( )if α% , for each point in the performance distribution, from the extreme best performer to the 
extreme worst performer, all of which are solely due to luck.  
 
We can now compare any ex-post ˆiα  with its appropriate ‘luck distribution’  Suppose we 
are interested in whether the performance of the ex- post best fund maxαˆ  is due to skill or luck.  If 
maxαˆ  is greater than the 5% upper tail cut off point from max( )f α% then we reject the null that its 
performance is due to luck (at 95% confidence).  We infer that the fund has genuine skill.  This 
can be repeated for any other point in the performance distribution, right down to the ex-post 
worst performing fund in the data. 
 
However, notwithstanding the above exposition in terms of the ‘luck distribution’ for alpha, 
our bootstrap analysis mainly focuses on the ‘luck distribution’ for the t-statistic of alpha 
i
tα~  
because it has better statistical properties (i.e. it is a pivotal statistic, see Kosowski et al 2004 and 
Hall 1992, for further discussion).  The intuitive reason for this is straightforward. The idiosyncratic 
risk of funds with few observations may have high variance and will in consequence tend to 
generate ‘outlier alphas’.  These funds may disproportionately occupy the extreme tails of the 
bootstrapped alpha distributions leading to a very high variance in their ‘luck distribution’.  
However, 
i
tα~ , scales alpha by its estimated standard error and therefore is independent of the 
‘nuisance parameter’ 2
iεσ and has superior statistical properties.  The argument applies a fortiori 
at the extremes of the performance distribution – which are of particular interest.   
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Throughout this study both the ex-post actual and bootstrap t-statistics are based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.  In our baseline 
bootstrap we set the minimum number of observations for the inclusion of any fund in the analysis 
at min,iT  = 36 months to minimize survivorship bias. 
 
4. Model Selection 
In this section, the equilibrium models described in section 2 are examined.  All tests are 
conducted at a 5% significance level unless stated otherwise and results presented relate to all 
UK equity mutual funds over the period April 1975 – December 2002 and are based on funds with 
min,iT  = 36, to minimize survivorship bias.  For each model, cross-sectional (across funds) 
average statistics are calculated.  A single ‘best model’ is chosen from each of the 3 model 
classes; (i) unconditional, (ii) conditional-beta and (iii) conditional alpha-beta, and these results 
are reported in table 1.  (In all, we examined over 50 models within the three classes of model 
and these results are available on request).  In none of our models are the Treynor-Mazuy (1966) 
and Merton-Henriksson (1981) market timing variables significant.  The key model selection 
metrics are the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) and the statistical significance of the 
individual parameters.   
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In the best three models, the cross-sectional average alpha takes on a small and 
statistically insignificant negative value.  The finding of negative abnormal performance (on 
average) is consistent with Blake and Timmermann (1998).  They report results for equally 
weighted portfolios of UK mutual funds, which are in line with our results in the bottom half of 
table 1, where we find that the alpha of an equally weighted portfolio of all funds have statistically 
significant negative alphas (for all three models).   
 
 However, of key importance for this study (and for investors) is the relatively large cross-
sectional standard deviations of the alpha estimates which is around 0.26% p.m. (3.1% p.a.), for 
the unconditional and conditional-beta models and somewhat larger at 0.75%p.m. for the 
conditional alpha-beta model.  This implies that the extreme tails of the distribution of abnormal 
performance may contain a substantial number of funds.  This is important since investors are 
more interested in holding funds in the right tail of the performance distribution and avoiding those 
in the extreme left tail, than they are in the ‘average fund’s’ performance. 
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The market excess return, tmr , , and the SMB factor betas are consistently found to be 
statistically significant across all three classes of model, whereas the HML  factor beta is often 
not statistically significant, even at a 10% significance level (as discussed further at the end of the 
next section).  We find that the momentum factor (MOM ) is generally not statistically significant 
at the individual UK fund level (e.g. Blake and Timmermann 1998, Tonks 2004), in contrast to US 
studies (Carhart 1997).  For the conditional-beta model (2nd column, table 1) only the dividend 
yield variable produces near statistically significant results.  In the conditional alpha-beta model 
we find that none of the conditional alphas has a t-statistic greater than 1.1 but some of the 
conditional betas are bordering on statistical significance and our best model is shown in column 
3. 
 
The above results suggest that the unconditional Fama-French 3 factor model explains 
UK equity mutual fund returns data reasonably well.  There is little additional explanatory power 
from the conditional and market timing variables (not reported).  The latter finding is consistent 
with existing studies of UK market timing (Fletcher 1995, Leger 1997) while Jiang (2003) also 
finds against superior market timing using nonparametric tests on US equity mutual funds. 
 
Turning now to diagnostics (bottom half of table 1), the adjusted R2 across all three 
models is around 0.8, while around 64% of funds have non-normal errors (Bera-Jarque statistic), 
and around 40% of funds have serial correlation (which is of order one – LM statistic).  The 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) is lowest for the unconditional model.  
  
The Fama-French 3 factor model was selected as the ‘best model’ for all three 
categories: unconditional, conditional beta and conditional alpha-beta model.  Figures 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, show histograms of the cross-section distribution of the actual alphas estimated 
from these three models, applied to all funds.  There is a wide spread of alpha estimates across 
all three models with a reasonable number of funds in each of the tails of the distribution 
 
[Figures 1, 2 and 3 here] 
    
5. Empirical Results: Bootstrap Analysis  
In this section we present the main findings from the application of the baseline bootstrap 
procedure. As discussed previously, we impose a minimum requirement of 36 observations for a 
fund to be included in the analysis.  This leaves a sample of 675 funds, of which 189 are non-
survivor funds (i.e. have ceased to exist at some point before the end of the sample period), while 
486 are survivor funds.  
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In Table 1, we reported that around 64% of mutual funds reject normality in their 
regression residuals.  As this finding partly motivates the use of the nonparametric bootstrap, we 
provide further information on this aspect.  Figure 4 shows the distribution of the residuals for 
selected funds in the upper (i.e. ‘best’ and 90th percentile fund) and lower tail (i.e. ‘worst’ and 10th 
percentile fund) of the (ex-post) performance distribution.  Residuals from funds in the extreme 
tails (e.g. ‘best’ and ‘worst’ funds) tend to exhibit higher variance and a greater degree of non-
normality than residuals from funds closer to the centre of the performance distribution (e.g. 90th 
and 10th percentiles).   
 
For funds in the upper tail, it is this high variance coupled with large positive residuals, 
that causes these ‘best funds’ to populate the very top end of the bootstrap distributions.  In turn 
this generates wide dispersion and non-normality in the performance of the very ‘top performing’ 
funds.  This is evident in figure 5a which shows the bootstrap histograms of 
i
tα~  at selected points 
of the performance distribution.  Figure 5b presents an almost mirror image for the lower end of 
the performance distribution.  This vividly illustrates that although funds in the center of the 
performance distribution may exhibit near normal idiosyncratic risks, those in each of the tails do 
not, and it is the latter in which investors are particularly interested.   
 
[Figure 4 here] 
[Figures 5a and 5b here] 
 
Table 2 shows bootstrap results for the full set of mutual funds (i.e. including all 
investment objectives) for the unconditional (Panel A), conditional-beta (Panel B) and conditional 
alpha-beta (Panel C) models, all of which use the Fama-French (FF) three-factor model.  The first 
row in each panel shows each fund’s actual (ex-post) ‘t-alpha’, ranked from lowest to highest (left 
to right) and the second row shows its associated value of ‘alpha’.  Row 3 (“p-tstat”) reports the 
bootstrap p-values of the ranked t-statistics in row 1, based on the ‘luck distribution’ for 
i
tα%  under 
the null of no outperformance.   
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
For example, using the unconditional model the ‘max’ fund (Table 2, Panel A) has an 
actual ex-post ˆtα  = 3.389 and achieved an abnormal performance of maxαˆ = 0.412% p.m.  
However, the bootstrap p-value of t-alpha for the ‘max’ fund is 0.437 (row 4).  The latter indicates 
that from among the 1,000 bootstrap simulations across all funds, under the null hypothesis of 
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zero abnormal performance, 43.7% of the bootstrap t-statistics for the highest ranked fund were 
greater than ˆtα  = 3.389.  This can be seen in the histogram in top left of figure 4b, where the 
vertical line shows the actual  ˆtα  = 3.389, relative to the ‘luck distribution’.  Thus using a 5% 
upper tail cut off point, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the best fund’s actual ˆtα  = 3.389 may 
be explained by luck alone.  Thus while the conventional ˆtα  = 3.389 of the best fund indicates 
genuine skill, the non-parametric bootstrap indicates ‘good luck’.  This apparent contradiction is 
due to the highly non-normal distribution of idiosyncratic risk across our top performing funds in 
the right tail of the performance distribution.  It demonstrates that standard test statistics may give 
misleading inferences when we look at funds in the extreme tails – as can be seen for example, 
for funds up to ‘7 max’ in table 2, panel A.   
 
Our complete set of bootstrap results show that of the top 20 ranked funds, 12 achieve 
genuine outperformance at a 10% significance level while 7 funds outperform at a 5% 
significance level.  However, as one moves into the centre of the performance distribution (i.e. at 
or below the top 3% of funds) there is no evidence of stock picking ability – the bootstrap 
indicates that any positive ˆtα ’s are due to luck rather than skill (see table 2, panel A and  figure 
4b). 
 
In the left tail of the distribution, (i.e. the left side of Panel A, table 2), the lowest ranked 
fund has ˆtα  = –5.358 with a bootstrap p-value of 0.009.  Hence for the ex-post ‘worst fund’ there 
is a near zero probability that this is due to bad luck rather than ‘bad skill’.  This fund has 
produced ‘truly’ inferior performance.  This can be seen in the upper left panel of figure 5b, where 
the vertical line indicates an actual ˆtα  = –5.358, which is to the left of the ‘luck distribution’.  It is 
clear from the left hand side of Panel A, table 2 (and figure 5b), that all funds in the left tail (up to 
the ‘min 40%’ point) have genuinely ‘poor skill’. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the bootstrap results is to see how many funds one might 
expect to achieve a given level of alpha performance by random chance alone and compare this 
with the number of funds which actually did achieve this level of alpha in the ‘real world’. For 
example, based on the unconditional (FF) model we would expect 10 funds to achieve αˆ  ≥ 0.5% 
p.m. (6% p.a.) based on random chance alone, whereas 19 funds exhibit this level of 
performance (or higher).  However, αˆ  ≥ 0.1% p.m. (1.2% p.a.) is expected to be achieved by 
173 funds solely based on chance, while in fact only 142 funds are observed to have reached this 
level of performance. Of course, this interpretation is consistent with the discussion of p-values 
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above.  There is greater evidence of genuine outperformance just within the extreme right tail, 
than nearer the centre of the performance distribution.   
 
[Figure 6 here] 
  
Figure 6 reinforces the above points by showing Kernel density estimates of the 
distributions of αˆt  in the ‘real data’ and the bootstrap distribution for tα%  - under the null of zero 
outperformance (i.e. the ‘luck distribution’).  It shows that the left tail of the distribution of actual 
αˆt ’s using the ‘real data’ (dashed line), lies largely to the left of the bootstrap distribution 
(continuous line).  Such poor performing funds cannot attribute their performance to bad luck but 
have ‘bad skill’.  In contrast, the extreme right tail of the distribution of ˆtα  for the ‘real data’ lies 
outside the ‘luck distribution’.  This means there are some, but not many, genuine ‘outperformers’. 
 
Panels B and C of Table 2 reports findings from the conditional-beta and conditional 
alpha-beta FF models. Inferences from the bootstrap (rows ‘t-alpha’, ‘p-tstat’), for the left tail of 
the performance distribution are very similar to those for the unconditional FF model in Panel A -  
‘bad luck’ is again not a defense for bad performance.   
.   
The results for the right tail of the distribution using the two conditional FF models 
(Panels B and C, Table 2) are broadly consistent with those for the unconditional model (Panel 
A).  Genuine stock picking ability is found for around 7% of funds using the condition-beta model 
and for about 4% of funds using the conditional alpha-beta model, but it is luck rather than skill 
which accounts for the positive performance of many funds further towards the centre of the 
performance distribution.   
 
In other results (available on request) we find that the removal of the tHML  variable 
produces virtually no changes from those reported in table 2, while addition of the momentum 
variable produces slightly more winners (around 5%) than the unconditional 3 factor model (of 
table 1, Panel A).  These models also support the view that many poorly performing funds have 
bad skill rather than bad luck.  
 
Our results are qualitatively consistent with Kosowski et al (2004) who find strong 
evidence of stock picking ability among top performing 5-10% of US funds (depending on the 
model chosen) and genuine poor performance for the funds in most of the left tail of the 
performance distribution. 
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Above we applied the bootstrap across all funds using each of our 3 ‘best models’.  
However, recall from Table 1 that the set of conditioning information variables were shown to be 
only weakly statistically determined (on average across funds) and these variables are also 
statistically insignificant for more than 90% of the funds.  Therefore, there is little evidence that 
conditional models offer additional explanatory power or are likely candidates for the ‘true’ 
equilibrium model of returns. We are inclined to place greater weight on results from the 
unconditional FF 3 factor model of panel A and our variants (described below) use this ‘baseline 
model’. 
 
Performance and Investment Styles 
Having found some ‘good skill’ and lots of ‘bad skill’ when analyzing all UK mutual funds 
together, the question now arises whether these skillful and not so skillful funds are equally 
distributed across different fund classifications or, whether they are concentrated in particular 
investment styles.  From the US mutual fund performance literature, there is some evidence that 
funds with a ‘growth’ investment style tend to be among the top performing funds (see Chen, 
Jegadeesh and Wermers 2000). 
 
In our data set 675 funds have a minimum of 36 monthly observations of which 143 
(21%) are income funds, 423 (63%) are ‘all companies’ funds and 109 (16%) are small stock 
funds.  To further address the ‘style question’ we apply the bootstrap procedure separately for 
each style, since the distribution of idiosyncratic risk may differ across different styles.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3, Panels A, B and C re-estimate the performance statistics of table 2, for the three 
investment styles.  Looking at the left side of all three Panels in Table 3 ‘(t-alpha’, ‘p-tstat’) it is 
clear that genuine ‘bad skill’ in the left tail is common across ‘all companies’ and small stock 
funds, whereas poorly performing income funds experience bad luck rather than ‘bad skill’. 
 
Looking at the right side of all three panels of Table 3, it is mainly high ranking equity 
income funds (Panel A) which achieve positive levels of performance, which cannot be accounted 
for by luck.  In particular, we find that most equity income funds ranked from the 3rd highest to the 
‘max 10%’ generally beat the bootstrap estimate of luck (at a 5% significance level), while the 
performance of the two highest ranked income funds could have been achieved by luck alone.  In 
contrast to the above, for UK ‘All Companies’ and small stocks (Table 3, Panels B and C, ‘t-
alphat’, ‘p-tstat’), there are hardly any funds which have genuine stock picking skills in the right 
tail of the performance distribution.  Note that amongst these top performing funds, standard t-
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tests would often give different inferences to the bootstrap (e.g. see the ‘max’, ‘2 max’ and ‘3 max’ 
funds for equity income and ‘UK all companies’).   
 
The above results are consistent with those in table 2, where of  the 7 funds with genuine 
skill (at a 5% significance level), 6 can be identified as income funds and one as a small company 
fund, whereas at a 10% significance level we have 12 skilled funds of which 6 are income funds, 
5 are ‘all companies’ and 1 is a small company fund.  Hence, in table 2 income funds are 
proportionately more representative of skill, than the other fund styles. 
 
Our findings for the UK of ‘skill’ mainly among some top performing UK income funds are 
in contrast to results in Kosowski et al (2004) for US mutual funds, who find that it is the top 
performing growth funds that have genuine skill.  (But note that Kosowski et al 2004 do not have 
a ‘small companies’ style classification).  
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
Figure 7 shows Kernel density estimates for the three investment styles. For equity 
income funds the extreme right tail of the distribution of actual t-statistics lies outside that of the 
‘luck distribution’, indicating the presence of some funds with ‘good skill’ rather than good luck.  
But for the other two style categories, actual ex-post performance does not exceed random 
sampling variation5.  We also see that the left tails of the actual ex-post t-statistics for all 
companies and small companies, lie largely to the left of the ‘luck distributions’, indicating that 
poor performance is unlikely to be due to bad luck.   
 
Performance and Fund Location 
All mutual funds in this study invest only in UK equity but funds are operated from both 
onshore UK and offshore locations such as Dublin, Luxembourg, Channel Islands and some 
other European locations.  Differential performance may arise due to possible information 
asymmetries between offshore versus onshore operations or simply differential skill given 
identical information. 
 
                                                 
5  It should be noted that Kernel density plots need not necessarily lead to the same conclusion as the 
bootstrap analysis.  This is because the Kernels compare the frequency of a given level of performance from 
among the actual funds, against the frequency of this same level of performance in the entire bootstrap 
matrix. The bootstrap p-value is a more sophisticated measure and compares the actual performance 
measure αˆt against the bootstrap distribution of performance α~t , at the same point in the cross-sectional 
performance distribution.  
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[Table 4 here] 
[Figure 8 here]    
 
The bootstrap results in table 4 (‘t-alpha’, ‘p-tstat’) are clear cut. Out of 553 onshore funds 
almost all of the top 20 possess genuine skill (panel A), whereas any positive abnormal 
performance by the 122 offshore funds (Panel B) may be attributed to luck. For the lower end of 
the performance distribution, both onshore and offshore funds demonstrate ‘poor skill’.  These 
results are clearly demonstrated in the Kernel density estimates of the actual and bootstrapped t-
statistics which are shown in figure 8.  These results are also consistent with those of table 2, 
where all of 12 ‘skilled’ funds (FF unconditional model, 10% significance level) can be identified 
as onshore funds.  
 
Performance and Survival 
 Some nonsurvivor funds are represented among funds whose performance is superior to 
chance.  For example, among the top 20 ranked funds (using the unconditional FF model, panel 
A, table 2), 7 funds beat luck at 5% significance level, 2 of which are nonsurvivors while 12 funds 
beat luck at a 10% significance level, 3 of which are nonsurvivors.   
 
A possible explanation for the positive performance of nonsurviving funds is that some of 
these funds were not forced to close down due to bad performance but in fact were merged or 
taken over, possibly because of their strong performance and consequent attractiveness. It may 
be that shorter-lived funds are initially set up to exploit ’new’ perceived investment styles and 
these successful funds are then taken over (possibly by larger established funds).  Indeed, Blake 
and Timmermann (1998), point out that 89% of the mutual funds reported as nonsurvivor funds 
were merged with other funds while only 11% were closed down over their sample period.  A 
large number of such ‘mergers’ may be due to good rather than bad performance - this is broadly 
consistent with behavior in a competitive funds market in the theoretical model of Berk and Green 
(2004). 
 
For the unconditional FF model (panel A, table 2) we find many poorly performing funds 
with ‘bad skill’.  Why any fund, particularly a long-lived fund, which truly underperforms would be 
permitted to survive in a competitive market is puzzling.  Kosowski et al (2004) also find strong 
evidence of genuine inferior performance and argue that this may be because performance 
measurement is a difficult task requiring, for precision, a long fund life-span.  Hendricks et al 
(1993) suggest that sustained inferior performing funds are those without skill which “churn” their 
portfolios too much and thus incur relatively high expenses which lowers their performance.   
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Extensions of the Bootstrap  
 The ‘baseline’ bootstrap procedure described in section 3 can be modified to incorporate 
further characteristics of the data, for example, serial correlation in residuals or, independent 
residual and factor resampling or, allowing for contemporaneous correlation among the 
idiosyncratic component of returns.  Where fund regression residuals indicate that such features 
are present, refinements to the bootstrap procedure help to retain this information in the 
construction of the bootstrap ‘luck’ distributions.  This is important in order to mimic the underlying 
‘true’ return generating process as closely as possible.  In an appendix to this study (available on 
request from the authors) we describe these bootstrap extensions in more detail and present 
results from their implementation.  However, we find that our inferences reported above, 
regarding skill versus luck in performance, are very similar.      
 
 
FUND OF FUNDS 
 Using the bootstrap (on t-alpha) and the complete sample period, we have identified a 
few funds that exhibit out-performance that is not due solely to luck, and many funds whose poor 
performance is due to ‘bad skill’ rather than bad luck.  Following on from this, a natural question is 
whether a portfolio of the ‘best’ or ‘worse’ performing funds have constant parameters and in 
particular, constant alphas.  Here, we are not looking at portfolio performance from an ex-ante 
viewpoint (as in studies of performance persistence) but examining whether the long-run risk 
adjusted performance of a chosen portfolio of funds has constant parameters, as we move 
through time.  Such evidence would complement our bootstrap results which use ‘t-alpha’ (from 
the whole sample) as the performance criterion.  Investors want to be reasonably sure that any 
‘alpha-performance’ is not sample specific.  
 
 To investigate this issue we apply recursive OLS (with GMM correction for standard 
errors) as well as the Kalman filter to the portfolio parameters - using the unconditional Fama-
French 3 factor model.  Recursive estimation allows the parameters to slowly change over time 
as new data becomes available.  The Kalman filter random coefficients model has the parameters 
,k tβ  on the market return, the SMB and HML factors and the portfolio ‘alpha’ tα  follow: 
 
(9)   , , 1 ,k t k t k tvβ β −= +     1, 2,3.k =  
(10)  1t t tvα α −= +  
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 This specification allows the tα , ,k tβ  to change considerably from period-to-period 
depending on the variances of the error terms νσ , which we assume are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated.  (Recursive OLS is a special case of the Kalman filter where 0νσ =  - see 
Hamilton 1994).   
 
 For an equally weighted portfolio of the best 12 funds (as identified in the bootstrap), the 
recursive OLS estimates (with GMM corrected standard errors) are shown in figure 9.  The 
recursive market beta coefficient is remarkably constant at around 0.9, as is the factor loading on 
SMB which is constant at around 0.25, while the factor loading on HML is not statistically different 
from zero for much of the time period.  The 12 best funds from the bootstrap also appear to give a 
genuine constant out-performance as the recursive estimate of alpha is around 0.58 (6.96% p.a.) 
over the whole recursive period to end December 2002.  
 
[Figure 9 and 10 here] 
 
 At the bottom end of the performance distribution (figure 10) the key feature of the 
equally weighted portfolio of the worst 50 funds is the near constancy of the negative alpha of 
around -0.35 (-4.2% p.a.).  Like the ‘best’ funds, the factor loadings on the market beta and SMB 
are reasonably constant, while that on HML is again statistically insignificant.  This general 
qualitative pattern is repeated when we include all of the worst funds up to the 40th percentile in 
our equally weighted portfolio – all of these funds have ‘bad skill’ as indicated by our bootstrap 
procedure. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 The Kalman filter estimates of the one-step ahead ( | 1t tα − ) and smoothed alphas( |T tα ) for 
the ‘best’ and ‘worse’ portfolios are similar to those for recursive OLS discussed above so in table 
5 we present the final state vectors (at time T), their p-values and the standard error ( νσ ) of the 
time varying parameters (see Hamilton 1994).  A portfolio of the best 12 funds as indicated by the 
bootstrap analysis (which all have actual t-alphas significant at a 10% critical value) has a final 
state vector Tα = 0.446 (p-value = 0.0083).  The relatively low standard error νσ = 0.0279 of the 
time varying alpha confirms that our ranking on bootstrap t-alphas does provide a portfolio of ‘top’ 
funds that exhibits constant outperformance over the whole period of around 5.3% p.a. - before 
taking account of transactions costs (but after payment of management fees).  The standard error 
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of the time varying market beta is virtually zero indicating this factor loading is constant.  As with 
the recursive OLS results, the HML factor is not statistically different from zero.   
 
For a portfolio of the worst 50 funds, alpha varies little ( νσ = 0.0003) and the final state 
vector is Tα = -0.337 (p-value < 0.0001) – similar to the recursive OLS results.  Therefore a 
constant poor performance of around -4.0% p.a. can be attributed to many of the worst 
performing funds, even when we allow for the possibility of time varying parameters. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Using a comprehensive data set for the UK, April 1975 – December 2002, with over 900 
equity mutual funds, we use a bootstrap methodology to distinguish between ‘skill’ and ‘luck’.  
Depending on the particular model chosen, we find genuine stock picking ability for somewhere 
between 5 and 10 percent of top performing UK equity mutual funds (i.e. performance which is 
not solely due to good luck).  This is consistent with recent US empirical evidence (Kosowski et al 
2004). Our results are robust with respect to alternative equilibrium models, different bootstrap 
resampling methods and allowing for the correlation of idiosyncratic shocks both within and 
across funds.   
 
Controlling for different investment objectives among funds, it is found that some of the 
top ranked equity income funds show genuine stock picking skills whereas such ability is 
generally not found among small stock funds and ‘all company’ funds.  We also find that positive 
performance amongst onshore funds is due to genuine skill, whereas for offshore funds, positive 
performance is attributable to luck.    
 
Note that the above results do not necessarily imply that the mutual fund industry is 
inefficient, since in a competitive market we only expect a few funds to earn positive risk adjusted 
returns over long horizons.  This is because funds with genuine skill and high past returns have 
large inflows (as observed in many empirical studies) and with increasing marginal costs to active 
management, this leads to zero long run average profits for most funds (Berk and Green 2004).   
 
At the negative end of the performance scale, our whole analysis strongly rejects the 
hypothesis that most poor performing funds are merely unlucky.  Most of these funds 
demonstrate ‘bad skill’, which is broadly consistent with results for US funds (Kosowski et al 
2004).  This result is not consistent with the competitive model of Berk and Green (2004), since 
‘bad skill’ should lead to large outflows of funds and the return on funds who survive should, in 
equilibrium, equal that on a passive (index) fund.  The continued existence over long time 
 ‘Mutual Fund Performance: Skill or Luck ?’ 
 25
periods, of a large number of funds which have a truly inferior performance (which cannot be 
attributed to bad luck), indicates that many investors either cannot correctly evaluate fund 
performance or find it ‘costly’ to switch between funds or suffer from a disposition effect.   
 
Our bootstrap ranks funds on the basis of t-alpha using the whole sample of data.  
However, when we apply recursive OLS or the Kalman filter-random coefficients model to a 
portfolio of funds based on our bootstrap rankings, we find considerable stability in the estimated 
portfolio alphas (as well as the market return and SMB factor loadings).  This suggests that there 
is genuine constant outperformance amongst a few top funds and genuine underperformance 
amongst many poorly performing funds.  
 
For the active fund management industry as a whole, our findings are something of a 
curate’s egg.  For the majority of funds with positive abnormal performance, we find this can be 
attributed to ‘good luck’.  We also show that ‘genuine’ top performers are not necessarily those 
with an ex-post ranking right at the ‘top’.  This makes it extremely difficult for the ‘average 
investor’ to pinpoint individual active funds which demonstrate genuine skill, based on their track 
records.   
 
The above results suggest that at the present time many UK equity investors would be  
better-off holding index/tracker funds, with their lower transactions costs.  On the policy side the 
UK government wishes to encourage long term saving via mutual (and pension) funds (Turner 
2004).  So perhaps it is time the Financial Services Authority changed its ‘health warning’ on 
investing in equity funds from, ‘The value of your investments can go down as well as up’ to, 
‘Active fund management may damage your financial health’.  Of course, the latter is predicated 
on the risk models examined in this study but we have explored many variants, using data on 
many funds (both survivors and non-survivors) and a long fund history.  
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Table 1.  Model Selection: Cross-Sectional Results of Model Estimations. 
 
Table 1 shows results from the estimation of the performance models described in Section 2 using all 
mutual funds. Only the best model from each of the 3 classes of model (1) unconditional model (2) 
conditional-beta and (3) conditional alpha-beta are reported.  The t-statistics are based on Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors. (t-statistics shown are cross-sectional 
averages of the absolute value of funds’ t-statistics).  Also shown are statistics on the percentage of funds 
which (i) reject normality in the residuals (Bera-Jarque test) and (ii) reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in residuals at lags 1 to 6 (LM test) – both at 5% significance level and the Schwartz 
Information Criterion (SIC).  The table also shows alpha and its t-statistic, for an equal weighted portfolio 
of all mutual funds.  All figures shown are cross-sectional averages. 
 
 
1 
 
2 3 Model 
unconditional conditional beta conditional alpha 
and beta 
 
Regression Coefficients 
      Average alpha (percent p. m.) -0.057 -0.032 -0.109 
      Standard Deviation of Alpha 0.261 0.261 0.754 
 
Unconditional Betas (t-stats in parentheses) 
      rmt 0.912 
(25.196) 
0.863 
(21.193) 
0.849 
(21.068) 
      SMBt 0.288 
(4.959) 
0.285 
(4.905) 
0.257 
(4.043) 
      HMLt -0.025 
(1.451) 
-0.023 
(1.451) 
0.016 
(1.207) 
 
Conditional Variables, Zt-1 (Dividend Yield) 
      Zt-1 * rmt - -0.048 
(1.408) 
-0.055 
(1.496) 
      Zt-1 * SMBt - - -0.002 
(1.513) 
      Zt-1 * HMLt - - 0.033 
(1.044) 
      Zt-1 - - -0.073 
(1.037) 
 
Model Selection Criteria 
      Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.811 0.818 
      SIC 1.352 1.365 1.432 
Residuals not normally 
distributed (% of funds) 
64 64 63 
      LM(1) statistics (% of funds)  40 40 44 
      LM(6) statistics (% of funds)  34 35 39 
 
Equally weighted Portfolio 
       Alpha -0.139 -0.112 -0.107 
       t-statistics -3.051 -2.464 -2.517 
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Table 2 : Bootstrap Results of UK Mutual Fund Performance 
 
Table 2 shows statistics for the full sample of mutual funds (including all investment objectives) for each of the three types of model selected in section 4.  Panel 
A reports statistics from the unconditional Fama and French FF (three-factor) model, Panel B for the conditional-beta FF model and Panel C for the FF 
conditional alpha-beta model.  The first row in each panel reports the ex-post t-statistics of alpha (% per month) for various points and percentiles of the 
performance distribution, ranging from worst fund (min) to best fund (max).  The second row reports the associated alpha for these t-statistics.  Row 3 reports the 
bootstrap p-values of the t-statistics based on 1,000 bootstrap resamples.  Both actual ex-post and bootstrap t-statistics are based on Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.  Results are restricted to funds with a minimum of 36 observations.   
  
 
Panel A : Unconditional Model  
(Ri – rf)t = αi + β1i(Rm – rf)t + β2iSMBt + β3i HMLt + εit 
 
Min 5 min min5% min10% min40% max30% max10% max5% max3% 20max 15max 12max 10max 7 max 5 max 3 max 2 max max 
t-alpha -5.358 -4.278 -3.045 -2.509 -0.873 0.212 1.177 1.698 1.955 2.023 2.282 2.501 2.545 2.678 2.777 2.991 3.365 3.389 
 Alpha -0.264 -0.400 -0.165 -0.435 -0.107 0.024 0.216 0.530 0.186 0.447 0.386 0.302 0.431 0.491 0.478 0.686 1.447 0.412 
p-tstat 0.009 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 0.978 0.491 0.447 0.284 0.070 0.020 0.038 0.094 0.157 0.232 0.128 0.437 
 
Panel B : Conditional-Beta Model  
(Ri – rf)t = αi + β1i(Rm – rf)t + β2iSMBt + β3i HMLt + β4i[Z3t-1 (Rm – rf)t] + εit 
 
 min 5 min min5% min10% min40% max30% max10% max5% max3% 20max 15max 12max 10max 7 max 5 max 3 max 2 max max 
t-alpha -5.334 -4.161 -2.929 -2.376 -0.723 0.354 1.394 1.856 2.090 2.189 2.305 2.456 2.622 2.809 3.036 3.161 3.353 4.036 
Alpha -0.262 -0.229 -0.596 -0.222 -0.148 0.064 0.189 0.166 0.801 0.568 2.309 0.661 0.429 0.515 1.431 0.580 0.751 0.449 
p-tstat 0.012 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 0.147 0.034 0.093 0.022 0.048 0.045 0.017 0.017 0.022 0.093 0.153 0.100 
 
Panel C : Conditional Alpha-Beta Model  
(Ri – rf)t = α0i + α1iZ3t-1 + β1i(Rm – rf)t + β2iSMBt + β3i HMLt + β4i[Z3t-1 (Rm – rf)t] + β5i[Z3t-1 SMBt] + β6i[Z3t-1 HMLt] + εit 
 
min 5 min min5% min10% min40% max30% max10% max5% max3% 20max 15max 12max 10max 7 max 5 max 3 max 2 max Max 
t-alpha -9.943 -4.106 -2.870 -2.251 -0.785 0.307 1.313 1.894 2.460 2.499 2.725 2.868 3.064 3.20 3.538 3.732 3.785 5.081 
Alpha -3.545 -0.484 -0.189 -0.738 -0.123 0.237 0.815 0.486 1.063 1.261 1.191 1.125 0.456 0.511 1.480 2.529 1.893 3.802 
p-tstat <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 0.881 0.211 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.006 0.055 0.169 0.069 
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Table 3. Statistical Significance of Mutual Fund Performance by Investment Objective 
 
Table 3 shows statistics for mutual funds categorized by investment objectives, including : Panel A (Equity Income funds), Panel B (UK All Companies funds) 
and Panel C (Smaller Companies funds).  All results use the unconditional Fama and French three-factor model.  The first row in each panel reports the the ex-
post t-statistics of alpha, ranked from lowest (min) to highest (max).  The second row reports the associated alpha (% per month) for these t-statistics.  Row 3 
reports the bootstrap p-values of the t-statistics based on 1,000 bootstrap resamples.  Both actual ex-post and bootstrap t-statistics are based on Newey-West 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.  Results are restricted to funds with a minimum of 36 observations.   
 
Unconditional Three Factor Model : (Ri – rf)t = αi + β1i(Rm – rf)t + β2iSMBt + β3i HMLt + εit 
 
 
Panel A : Equity Income    
 
min 5 min min5% min10% min20% min40% max30% max20% max10% 10max 7 max 5 max 3 max 2 max Max 
t-alpha -2.954 -2.166 -1.863 -1.488 -0.912 -0.197 0.685 0.977 1.667 1.740 2.245 2.501 2.545 2.634 2.777 
Alpha -0.330 -0.204 -0.314 -0.164 -0.122 -0.028 0.089 0.470 0.184 0.275 0.229 0.302 0.431 0.279 0.478 
p-tstat 0.337 0.165 0.179 0.141 0.398 0.721 0.111 0.171 0.007 0.107 0.008 0.005 0.067 0.181 0.415 
 
Panel B : UK All Companies 
 
min 5 min min5% min10% min20% min40% max30% max20% max10% 10max 7 max 5 max 3 max 2 max Max 
t-alpha -5.359 -4.190 -3.118 -2.575 -2.009 -1.084 0.011 0.509 1.045 2.023 2.282 2.672 2.776 2.965 3.389 
Alpha -0.264 -0.355 -0.226 -0.491 -0.164 -0.099 0.009 0.063 0.414 0.447 0.386 0.543 0.507 0.479 0.412 
p-tstat 0.014 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 1 1 0.643 0.422 0.083 0.285 0.296 0.301 
 
Panel C : Smaller Companies  
 
min 5 min min5% min10% min20% min40% max30% max20% max10% 10max 7 max 5 max 3 max 2 max Max 
t-alpha -4.953 -3.117 -3.095 2.772 -2.464 -1.128 0.008 0.397 1.286 1.356 1.610 1.742 2.226 2.991 3.365 
Alpha -0.350 -0.360 -0.479 -0.405 -0.522 -0.278 0.016 0.092 0.253 0.472 0.318 0.716 2.235 0.686 1.447 
p-tstat 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 1 0.647 0.624 0.490 0.579 0.256 0.040 0.096 
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Table 4. Statistical Significance of Mutual Fund Performance by Fund Location 
 
Table 4 shows statistics for mutual funds by location.  Panel A reports results for funds operated from ‘Onshore UK’ and Panel B for funds operated ‘Offshore’.  
All results use the unconditional Fama and French three-factor model.  The first row in each panel reports the ex-post t-statistics of alpha for various points and 
percentiles of the performance distribution, ranging from worst fund (min) to best fund (max).  The second row reports the associated alpha values (% per month) 
for these t-statistics.  Row 3 reports the bootstrap p-values of the t-statistics based on 1,000 bootstrap resamples.  Both actual ex-post and bootstrap t-statistics are 
based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors.  Results are restricted to funds with a minimum of 36 observations.   
 
 
Unconditional Three Factor Model : (Ri – rf)t = αi + β1i(Rm – rf)t + β2iSMBt + β3i HMLt + εit 
 
 
Panel A : Onshore UK funds    
 
min 5 min min5% min10% min20% min40% max20% max10% 20max 15max 10max 5 max 3 max 2 max max 
t-alpha -5.359 -4.119 -2.915 -2.464 -1.681 -0.739 0.755 1.287 2.023 2.282 2.545 2.777 2.991 3.365 3.389 
Alpha -0.264 -0.321 -0.510 -0.522 -0.362 -0.0630 0.158 0.130 0.447 0.386 0.431 0.478 0.686 1.447 0.412 
p-tstat 0.011 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.970 0.615 0.057 0.010 0.006 0.073 0.107 0.063 0.306 
 
Panel B : Offshore  
 
min 5 min min5% min10% min20% min40% max20% max10% 20max 15max 10max 5 max 3 max 2 max max 
t-alpha -4.278 -3.751 -3.521 -2.953 -2.330 -1.454 0.008 0.489 0.067 0.429 0.881 1.101 1.390 1.450 1.948 
Alpha -0.400 -0.414 -0.310 -0.440 -0.310 -0.226 0.004 0.075 0.006 0.104 0.355 0.588 0.284 0.593 0.487 
p-tstat 0.012 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.998 1 0.985 
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Table 5. Kalman Filter : Fund of Funds (July 1985 – December 2002) 
 
The final state vector is the value of φ = (α, β) at the end of the sample period with its associated p-value given in the next column.  The standard error of the 
time varying parameter is the estimate σv, where φt = φt-1 + vt is the ‘state’ or ‘transition’ equation.   
 
Portfolio of Best 12 Funds 
 
Portfolio of Worst 50 Funds  
Final State 
Vector 
p-value Standard Error 
Time Varying 
Parameter 
Final State 
Vector 
p-value Standard Error 
Time Varying 
Parameter 
Constant αT 0.4463 0.0083 0.0279 -0.3379 < 0.0001 0.0003 
Rm β1T 0.9077 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.9465 < 0.0001 0.0007 
SMB β2T 0.3168 0.0001 0.0189 0.2335 < 0.0001 0.0004 
HML β3T -0.1241 0.0573 0.0157 -0.0339 0.2192 0.0004 
 
Log Likelihood 
 
-348.33 
 
-249.35 
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Figure 1 : Cross-Sectional Alpha : Unconditional Model 
 
Figure 2 : Cross-Sectional Alpha : Conditional-Beta Model 
 
Fgure 3 : Cross-Sectional Alpha : Conditional Alpha-Beta Model 
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Figure 4 : Histograms of Residuals  
 
Figure 4 shows histograms of the residuals from the estimation of the unconditional FF model, at various 
points in the upper end and lower end of the cross-sectional performance distribution.  
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Figure 5a : Histograms of Bootstrap t-alpha Estimates   
        (Upper End of the Distribution)  
 
Figure 5a shows histograms of the bootstrap t-statistics of alpha (under H0 : αi = 0) at various points in the 
upper end of the performance distribution (using the 3 factor FF model).  The actual (ex-post) t-statistics 
αˆt  are indicated by the vertical dashed line.  
 
 
  
Actual t-alpha = 3.389 Actual t-alpha 
= 2.67 
Actual t-alpha = 
1.698 
Actual t-alpha = 1.177 
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Figure 5b. Histograms of Bootstrap t-alpha Estimates   
          (Lower End of the Distribution) 
 
Figure 5b shows histograms of the bootstrap t-statistics of alpha (under H0 : αi = 0) at various points in the 
lower end of the performance distribution (using the 3 factor FF model).  The actual (ex-post) t-statistics 
αˆt  are indicated by the vertical dashed line.  
 
 
 
Actual t-alpha = -5.358 Actual t-alpha 
= -4.180 
Actual t-alpha 
= -3.045  Actual t-alpha 
= -2.509 
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Figure 6. Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap distribution of t-alphas – All Funds. 
 
Figure 6 shows Kernel densities of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha from the unconditional FF model over the full sample of 
mutual funds.  Funds are required to have a minimum of 36 observations and t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted.  The plots are generated using a Gaussian 
Kernel.    
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Figure 7. Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap distribution of t-alphas - 
by Investment Style 
 
Figure 7 shows Kernel densities of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha using separate 
bootstraps on the funds of different investment styles.  Results relate to the unconditional FF model.  t-statistics are 
Newey-West adjusted and funds with a minimum of 36 observations are used.  The plots are generated using a 
Gaussian Kernel.    
 
Equity Income 
 
 
UK All Companies 
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Smaller Companies 
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Figure 8. Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap Distribution of  
t-alphas - by Location 
 
Figure 8 shows Kernel densities of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha 
using separate bootstraps on the onshore and offshore funds.  Estimates are from the unconditional FF 
model, t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted and funds with a minimum of 36 observations are used. 
The plots are generated using a Gaussian Kernel.   
 
Onshore Funds 
 
Offshore Funds 
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Figure 9. Recursive Estimates of Parameters (Portfolio of ‘Best 12 Funds’) : October 1981 – December 2002 
 
Note : The ‘best 12 funds’ are selected by their bootstrapped t-alphas (10% level of significance), using the whole data set.   
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Figure 10. Recursive Estimates of Parameters (Portfolio of ‘Worst 50 Funds’) : October 1981 – December 2002 
 
Note : The ‘50 worst funds’ are selected by their bootstrapped t-alpha (using the whole data set).   
